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ASSUMPTION OF RISK
distributor of a defective product has an easier burden of proof than one
who must sue in negligence. One of the main objectives of section 402A
is to provide increased protection for consumers who are injured by
defective products. 9 By basing liability on proof of defect and thus
making recovery against a distributor of a defective product much more
likely than in a negligence action, section 402A has given the consumer
increased protection.
CHARLES H. CRANFORD
Torts-Rejection of the Voluntariness Test in Assumption of Risk
The doctrine of assumption of risk in the law of negligence, while
still relatively quite young,1 has for some time been roundly condemned
by courts 2 and commentators 3 alike as a judicially created device afford-
ing legal insulation to defendants who have concededly breached their
duty toward injured plaintiffs. Dissatisfaction with the doctrine has led
some jurisdictions tor restrict severely the application of assumption of
risk and in some areas to wipe it out altogether.4 As a result of Hoar v.
Sherburne Corp. ,5 it is arguable that as a practical matter assumption
of risk is no longer-available as a separate defense to a landowner in a
negligence action in Vermont.
In Hoar, plaintiff sustained injuries while crossing an access road
cutting through property which defendant owned and maintained as a
ski resort. At the time of the mishap, plaintiff was returning from defen-
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 350 (1964).
'Assumption of risk does not appear to have been recognized as a separate defense to a
negligence action before the turn of the nineteenth century. Prosser indicates that Cruden v. Fen-
tham, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (K.B. 1799), is probably the first distinguishable case. W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 68 n.9 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent to which
uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its
felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula,
undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.. 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter concludes that the phrase "assumption of risk" should be discarded. Id. at 72. See
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 96 (1959); cases cited in
James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 187 n. 11 (1968).
'See, e.g.. James, supra note 2; Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of
Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5 (1961).
'See text accompanying note 28 infra.
1327 F. Supp. 570 (D. Vt. 1971).
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dant's ski shop where she had gone for the purpose of buying some
"warm-up" pants and on the way to which a sudden snow storm had
developed. On the return trip, plaintiff slipped and fell on the path
leading across the access road, although she had been looking where she
was going and had seen the unsanded ice beneath her feet. At least fifteen
minutes had passed from the time the snow storm began to the time of
the accident. On these facts, the jury was allowed to find that plaintiff
was a business visitor of defendant, that she had carefully conducted
herself while walking on an unsafe pathway that was subject to the
control of defendant, and that she was entitled to recover damages for
the injuries that she had suffered.
Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, con-
tending inter alia that plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter of law.
The court denied the motion and in doing so sharply restricted the
doctrine of assumption of risk itself, thereby going further than even
those recent decisions in other jurisdictions that have extended the duty
owed to others by certain owners and occupiers of land. 6 In order to
present the court's decision in its proper perspective, and with due cred-
ence to the complex issues involved, it will first be necessary to summa-
rize briefly the background of the law in this area.
Assumption of risk as a defense in negligence actions originated in
the reluctance of the common law courts to impose burdensome restric-
tions on expanding industry by way of untrammelled liability during the
Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century. 7 During these early
stages the defense was designed to allow an admittedly negligent em-
ployer to escape liability through the use of a pure fiction that held the
plaintiff to have "assumed" all risks arising out of the master-servant
relationship. Later, this rigid rule was relaxed somewhat, and the em-
ployee was held to have assumed only those risks of which he was aware
or which were so patent that reasonable men could not differ as to their
existence.8 But in the meantime the rationale of assumption of risk in
6See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
7See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943). This position had
achieved popular and judicial acceptance in response to Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex.
1837), a landmark case from which assumption of risk received its greatest impetus. PROSSER § 68
n.9.
8See, e.g., Focht v. Johnson, 51 Wash. 2d 47, 315 P.2d 633 (1957). This case was overruled in
Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 60-Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962), which explicitly held that
assumption of risk would no longer be recognized as a defense to an employer inia negligence action.
See text accompanying notes 28-29 infra.
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this context had come to be applied to other interpersonal relationships
as well, until finally it had become quite thoroughly merged with the law
of negligence in general. Ironically, the policy considerations that gave
rise to the doctrine in the master-servent area-maximum freedom to
expanding industry-steadily subsided with the establishment of indus-
try as a burgeoning stronghold in this country, with the result that we
have been left to struggle with a legal defense mechanism whose very
raison d'etre has now been expressly rejected, as will be seen,9 by a
substantial number of jurisdictions.
As applied today, assumption of risk is subject to so much confu-
sion that not a few learned legal scholars have advocated its abolition.'0
By means of the defense a.defeiidant is effectively insulated from liability
potentially arising from his own* negligence if he establishes that the
plaintiff voluntarily chose to encounter the known risk created by the
defendant's negligence. Thus, there are two primary ingredients of the
defense, which the defendant has the burden of proving" by a greater
weight of the evidence: first, the plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation
of the risk created by the defendant, and second, the plaintiff's voluntary
decision to encounter this risk despite such knowledge. 2 If the plaintiff,
with full knowledge and appreciation of all the facts and with no com-
pulsion whatsoever to do so, makes an entirely free and voluntary deci-
sion to incur the risk anyway, he is barred on grounds of assumption of
risk from recovering for consequential injuries. The same idea is often
expressed in the alternative by saying that the decision is not a free and
voluntary one when the advantages to be gained by the plaintiff's meet-
ing the risk outweigh the relative disadvantages thereof'3 or when the
defendant has not afforded the plaintiff a reasonably safe alternative
choice of action. 4 In either event, it is presumed that the plaintiff has
9See text accompanying note 29 infra.
'"See, e.g., James, supra note 2; Wade, supra note 3.
"See note 23 infra.
"PROSSER § 68, at 447.
"Id. at 440.
"Id. at 451. It should be noted that these alternative expressions of the voluntariness require-
ment involve two clearly distinguishable concepts. Firstly, the term "voluntary" can be applied to
behavior directed to the end which the plaintiff contemplates in choosing whether or not to encoun-
ter an unreasonable risk created by the defendant. Attainment of the objectives sought by the
plaintiff may be, on balance, so socially important as to compel on policy grounds a holding that
the plaintiff's ultimate decision to encounter the risk cannot be legally voluntary. In the converse
situation, when the plaintiff's goal is not so vital, the doctrine of assumption of risk may be applied
to deny recovery-in other words, the advantages to be gained from meeting a known risk are held
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actual knowledge of the negligently created risk. 5
Assumption of risk is also generally extended to cover situations in
which the plaintiff has expressly consented to take his chances with the
risk 6 or in which such consent may safely be implied." In such cases,
however, a lack of duty on the part of the defendant is the basis for a
denial of recovery, and the issue of negligence is never reached at all. Still
other courts appear to confuse the distinctions between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence', by applying either or both to situa-
tions in which the plaintiff unreasonably encounters or negligently fails
to discover the risk. The net chaos has led some writers to suggest that
to be outweighed by their corresponding disadvantages. The Hoar court rejected this dichotomy in
holding that the possible lack of social desirability of the plaintiff's objectives should not limit the
defendant's liability. 327 F. Supp. at 577-78.
Secondly, the term "voluntary" can with equal validity be applied to behavior directed to the
means by which the plaintiff in fact encounters the unreasonable risk. Courts frequently deny
recovery under the guise of assumption of risk because in "voluntarily" choosing to encounter the
risk, the plaintiff declined to exploit reasonably safe and convenient alternative means, of which he
was aware, of attaining the same objective that was contemplated. In Hoar a reasonable alternative
route was not available to plaintiff. Id. at 571. Thus it might be argued that Hoar rejected the
voluntariness test only to the extent that voluntariness is used in the sense of "social utility" to the
plaintiff, and that consequently the impact of this case is greatly diluted. Arguably, however.
voluntariness" and the doctrine of assumption of risk are irrelevant as regards the plaintiff's choice
between alternatives, because in this context the issue of the defendant's liability is perfectly amena-
ble to logical resolution in terms of contributory negligence and thus by the objective inquiry of
whether the plaintiff's choice was unreasonable.
"i1f the plaintiff is to be saddled with constructive knowledge of the risk because of its obvious
or apparent nature, this is equivalent to saying that he was contributorily negligent in not in fact
discovering the danger. Cf. PROSSER § 68, at 447-49.
61d. at 442. Indeed, some courts expressly purport to limit application of assumption of risk
to situations involving a contractual relation between the parties. E.g., Walsh v. Vest Coast Mines,
31 Wash. 2d 396, 406, 197 P.2d 233, 238 (1948).
tTPROSSER § 68 n.29.
"sSee note 22 infra. Any precise and unequivocal distinction between these two defenses is
exceedingly difficult to pinpoint without a thorough analysis of the issues which each raises. It is
often said that contributory negligence is measured by the objective standard of the reasonable man
as applied to the plaintiff's behavior, while assumption of risk is properly confined to the subjective
knowledge and appreciation of the risk which the plaintiff encounters. PROSSER § 68. at 441. That
this distinction is not satisfactory for all purposes is evidenced by the fact that contributory
negligence may be used in two senses, one employing an objective and the other an ostensibly
subjective standards: the defect is apparent, but the plaintiff negligently fails to notice it; and the
plaintiff is fully aware of a patently obvious and unreasonable risk yet proceeds to encounter it. It
should be noted; however, that even the latter situation does not present a pure application or the
subjective standard. Although the plaintiff concededly has actual knowledge of the danger. his
conduct in choosing to -meet it is nevertheless compared with that of the ordinary reasonable man
under like circumstances. This overlapping of contributory negligence and assumption of risk has
caused some confusion in the courts. Id.
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assumption of risk as a separate doctrine is quite dispensable 9 and that
the issues traditionally disposed of by that defense are much less confus-
ingly treated under the headings of consent,2" lack of duty, 21 and contri-
butory negligence. 22
It appears unlikely, however, that there will be a direct renunciation
of the doctrine in the near future, if only for the reason that it provides
an attractive and convenient vehicle for the denial of recovery in cases
in which a highly intricate network of competing interests would other-
wise have to be dealt with and resolved. On the other hand, a growing
number of jurisdictions have effectively approached the same result by
coming in through the back door, so to speak, in dealing with the scope
of liability in negligence cases. Instead of affirmatively restricting the
reach of assumption of risk and thereby imposing a greater procedural
burden on the defendant,23 these courts have imposed a broader scope
of duty on certain owners and occupiers of land, thereby rendering as-
sumption of risk inappropriate in situations in which it would have
traditionally been applied.
In the usual situation, the general rule is that a landowner has no
duty to render affirmative precautions, even to the extent of a warning,
"against dangers which are known to the [invitee], or so obvious to him
"See authorities cited note 3 supra.
"
0In the field of intentional torts the plaintiff's consent to the tortious invasion has
long been recognized as a defense. Consent has not been an established rubric in the law
of negligence, but there is no reason why it cannot exist here too. Consent to what? In
both intentional torts and negligence the consent is to the defendant's conduct. In the
intentional tort this involves consent to the actual invasion of the plantiff's interest in
person or property. In negligence it involves only his agreement to being subjected to a
danger of possible invasion. In other words the plaintiff "assumes the risk."
Wade, supra note 3, at 7.21The "defendant's duty and the plaintiff's assumption of risk are not correlative and it is
misleading to define one in terms of the other." Id. at II.
2North Carolina evidently recognizes no separate doctrine of assumption of risk in the absence
of an express contractual agreement between the parties, and issues raised both by that defense and
contributory negligence are lumped together and treated in terms of the latter. E.g., Jernigan v.
Atlantic Coastline R.R., 275 N.C. 277,-167 S.E.2d 269 (1969); Broadaway v. King-Hunter, Inc.,
236 N.C. 673, 73 S.E.2d 86l (1953); Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N.C. 377, 64 S.E.2d 276 (1951).
2lt should be emphasized that assumption of risk is a defense which must in all instances be
pleaded and proved by the defendant in order to defeat the plaintiff's recovery. PROSSER § 68, at
455. On the other hand, while most courts likewise treat contributory negligence as a defense, there
are a few jurisdictions which impose the burden on the plaintiff to plead and prove his freedom
from contributory negligence as well as the defendant's negligence in order to state a cause of action.
This was the position adopted, for example, in Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 A. 433 (1930),
despite a vigorous dissent by-Chief Justice Wheeler.
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that he may be expected to discover them.1 24 Assumption of risk, then,
would normally be a perfectly legitimate defense here in the absence of
qualifying circumstances. There has been a recent tendency, however, to
roll back this general "no-duty" rule with respect to certain classes of
landowners on the basis of the anticipatory nature of the harm despite
the obviousness of the risk or the plaintiffs knowledge thereof.
There appears to be no difficulty in making an exception to the rule
with respect to public utilities and government agencies.25 The reason
generally given for treating these concerns more strictly than other land-
owners is that the former hold out their services and facilities to mem-
bers of the public, who are entitled to make use of them and who may
reasonably expect and demand to be able to use them in reasonable
safety." Neither knowledge nor obviousness of the risk should be a
defense here, for the obligations of the public 'utility and government
agency are such that they may not be relieved from responsibility by
forcing members of the visiting public to choose between carefully meet-
ing an unreasonable risk which acts as an obstacle to attainment of the
proffered right and foregoing that right altogether. It follows that under
these circumstances the public utility or government agency should rea-
sonably foresee that such members would choose to encounter known
or obvious dangers that they would not otherwise encounter, solely be-
cause of their reluctance to give up the public right to which they are
entitled.
Similar considerations prevail in the employer-employee relation-
ship, although liability here is couched in terms of abandonment of
assumption of risk rather than an extension of duty. It has already been
intimated that several jurisdictions have by decision or statute expressly
"
4RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS _§ 343A(1), Comment e (1965). See cases cited
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Appendix § 343A, Comment e at 233-34 (1966).
2See, e.g., Dierks v. Alaska Air Transport, 109 F. Supp. 695 (D. Alas. 1953); Williamson v.
Derry Elec. Co., 89 N.H. 216, 196 A. 265 (1938); Toroian v. Parkview Amusement Co., 331 Mo.
700, 56 S.W.2d 134 (1932).
21See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(l), Comment a (1965).
2'North Carolina adopted this position many years ago. E.g., Sibbert v. Scotland Cotton Mills,
145 N.C. 308, 59 S.E. 79 (1907); Marks v. Harriet Cotton Mills, 135 N.C. 287, 47 S.E. 432 (1904).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has occasionally paid lip service to assumption of risk in
extending liability to employers, but as often as not it has brought in contributory negligence as
well without attempting to distinguish the two and without acknowledging that they may be
anything but identical. See note 22 supra.
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eliminated assumption of risk from this area, for reasons such as those
persuasively stated in Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital:28
The policy reasons which gave rise to the doctrine of assumption of risk
in the master-servant area . . . no longer suffice to support the harsh
effects upon injured employees who seek redress for their employer's
negligence. Public opinion, reflected in workmen's compensation legis-
lation. has dictated a change in the underlying concepts of employers'
responsibility. In almost all areas of industrial activity, social insur-
ance has replaced the common law rules of liability and defenses which
grew out of the judicial inclination to foster a growing economy. No
longer can it be said that a judicially-imposed doctrine of assumption
of risk is necessary or desirable to protect expanding industry from
being crippled by employers' responsibility for tortious conduct toward
their employees.29
The rule which has emerged from this metamorphosis of public
sentiment is that an employee never assumes risks arising from the
employer's negligence but does assume those which remain after due
care has been exercised by the employer-in other words, those risks
which are inherent in the work and which are contractually borne by the
employee.30 This qualification prevents the employer from being treated
as an insurer of his employees' safety, yet leaves the employer liable for
his own culpable acts and omissions. This in turn relieves the employees
of having to choose between meeting unreasonable risks and forgoing
their means of livelihood altogether.
Any tendency toward expanding the duty owed by landowners other
than public utilities, government agencies, and employers has under-
standably been much more sluggish. This is probably a reflection of the
general reluctance of the judiciary to break new ground in an area
strongly rooted in tradition 3 1 but it by no means indicates that such
inroads have not in fact been made. The next such extension of duty
would logically seem to attach to the commercial landowner who invites
2 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1967); see, e.g., cases cited therein.
22d. at 318, 373 P.2d at 773.
3"See, e.g., Goodwin v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 335 Mo. 398,406,72 S.W.2d 988, 991 (1934).
3
'Concepts of property and ownership of land have held a lofty position among English-
speaking peoples since feudal times, and it is thus understandable that immediate suspicion and
hostility should attach to any attempts of the judiciary to undercut the absolute dominion of the
property owner over his land. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1432 (1956). This accounts
in large part for the glacial extension of liability into this general area and the resulting inhibition
which has persisted to the present day.
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members of the public onto his premises in order to have a pecuniary
benefit conferred upon him and who in doing so has impliedly estab-
lished the reasonable safety of these premises. This progressive step, in
fact, has recently been taken in several jurisdictions, motivated in large
part by the theory that a commercial landowner who has held out defec-
tive premises for the public's use should not be heard to complain on
grounds of assumption of risk when a member of that public suffers
injuries as a result of having chosen to make use of those premises for
the very purpose for which they were tendered.
The court in Hoar lent its full support to this position by quoting
with approval section 343A(l) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
"'A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.' "3 In holding that a
commercial landowner may be held liable even to an invitee who had
knowledge of the risk which caused the injury, the court joined those
other jurisdictions which have imposed an active duty on the part of the
commercial landowner to provide reasonably safe premises for invitees,
which goes beyond the common law obligation to protect against known
or foreseeably dangerous conditions that are not known by the invitee
or apparent to him.34
But Hoar goes even further than this. Faced with the argument that
the plaintiff in that case voluntarily encountered the risk of the icy path
when she was under no compulsion to do so, the court simply rejected
the rule which bars a plaintiff from recovery because of assumption of
risk where the choice of action has been a free and voluntary one.35 The
duty of the landowner is thus not limited by the fact thatthe invitee
voluntarily and reasonably encounters the known or obvious risk, if it
could be anticipated by the landowner that harm arising from that risk
would nevertheless occur. Under the facts of the Hoar case, it therefore
appears that there is -no room for assumption of risk by any stretch of
the imagination-the voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice of action is
immaterial under the new rule, and the fact that the plaintiff had actual
2Pribble v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 249 Ore. 184, 437 P.2d 745 (1968); cf. Findley v. Lipsitz,
106 Ga. App. 24, 126 S.E.2d 299 (1962).
33327 F. Supp. at 577, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965).
3See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
31327 F. Supp. at 577-78.
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knowledge of the dangerous condition is equally meaningless in view of
the affirmative duty imposed on the defendant to make the premises safe
as against known or obvious dangers which may be anticipated to cause
harm. Liability may be denied only by a finding that the plaintiff, having
discovered the dangerous condition, proceeded to encounter it in an
unreasonable manner, which properly gives rise to an issue of contribu-
tory negligence and not assumption of risk .3
It would appear that the court in Hoar has performed an inestima-
ble service to the legal profession in having taken a giant step toward
the elimination of much of the confusion surrounding the application of
assumption of risk by focusing instead on intelligent consideration of the
primary issue in these cases. That issue, simply enough, is whether or
not the defendant should be held liable despite the plaintiffs knowledge
of the risk he chose to encounter. In dealing with this question, it must
be decided whether or not the plaintiff's choice of action under the
circumstances was a reasonable one. Another way of putting this is by
asking whether or not a duty will be imposed on the defendant to the
extent that the plaintiffs choice will be deemed as a matter of law to
have been a reasonable one. Sidetracking on the issue of voluntariness
by asking whether the advantages gained by the plaintiff's having met
the risk negligently created by the defendant outweighed the disadvan-
tages thereof serves only to obscure the determinative question. Perhaps
cognizant of this, some courts seem to have gone out of their way in
finding a lack of voluntariness on the part of the plaintiff's action in
order to permit recovery.3 7 Consideration of this question should not be
necessary at all if in fact it can be determined that the duty of the
defendant shall be extended to protect the plaintiff under the attendant
circumstances, as it was so determined in Hoar.3
It is important to bear in mind, however, that while the duty im-
posed in Hoar affected a commercial landowner under the limiting facts
of that case, it is by no means certain that the court would further extend
this duty to ordinary landowners should the question arise in the future.
Neither can it safely be said that the court's rejection of the voluntari-
ness test under the facts in Hoar necessarily eliminates that requirement
16See notes 18, 22 supra.
'See, e.g., Peterson v. W. T. Raleigh Co., 274 Minn. 475, 144 N.W.2d 555 (1966).
31"[A]ny general doctrine denying recovery to one who voluntarily elects to take a chance is
an unwarranted limitation on the landowner's duty." Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Land-
owner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108, 120 (1961) (emphasis by the author).
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as to all situations in which assumption of risk may present itself.31 Still,
it undoubtedly appears that this case goes beyond the limitations in this
general area imposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and in this
regard it is in keeping with the recent tendency to extend liability to
commercial owners and occupiers of land by virtue of broadening con-
cepts of duty.40
Comment a to section 343A(l) of the Restatement states that that
subsection "includes in particular the patrons of a public utility who
enter land in its possession seeking its services, to which as members of
the public they are entitled," 41 and it also applies to invitees of a govern-
ment or of a government agency. Commercial landowners are not men-
tioned at all in this context, let alone ordinary owners and occupiers of
land, and it thus seems that the Restatement has taken an overly cau-
tious stand on the extension of duty owed to invitees, a stand which has
rightly been disapproved in Hoar. This case, then, strikes a balance
between the Restatement position and the logical end result of the recent
liberal expansion with respect to landowners-a sweeping imposition of
duty without regard to the specific label which might properly be at-
tached to a given landowner.42 Other jurisdictions have gone further than
Hoar in the direction of imposing the same standard of duty on all
landowners regardless of classification 43 but none has taken the bold
step of holding that the voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice of action
may not be held to negate the effects of the duty so imposed. It is at
39See note 14 supra.
'
0 For excellent discussions of the problems involved in this general area, see Keeton, Personal
Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629 (1952); Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 20 TEx. L. REV. 562 (1942).
41RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(l), Comment a (1965). "In determining whether
the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is
entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance
indicating that the harm should be anticipated." Id. § 343A(2).
4'Professor James would seem to adhere to the latter position in all instances save those in
which there is an express agreement to assume the risk. See James, supra note 2, at 187-88.
'ORowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), is the landmark
case which has broken all precedent in abolishing the arbitrary common law classification of
plaintiffs as trespassers, licensees, and invitees usually applied in determining the duty owed by a
defendant landowner to the plaintiff. The thrust of the decision is to impose on landowners a single
duty of reasonable care in all situations regardless of the plaintiff's status. The plaintiff's particular
status is still one factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct, but under Rowland it is no longer solely determinative of the standard by which that
conduct is measured. Accord, Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d
445 (1969); cf. Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955).
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present uncertain where the line may ultimately be drawn with respect
to those classes of landowners affected by the rejection of the voluntari-
ness test, if indeed one is drawn at all. Nevertheless, Hoar's innovative
approach may well prove to be the legal catalyst long needed in this area
to remove some of the injustices which result when assumption of risk
is mechanically applied to situations in which it is not warranted and in
which the plaintiff cannot conscionably be allowed to go uncompen-
sated.44 If so, the change can only be a beneficial one.
Without specifically so holding, the court in Hoar arguably may
have done away with assumption of risk in Vermont in all landowner
cases by expressly eliminating one of the two primary elements of the
defense. The other element-actual or implied knowledge of the
risk-has been severely emasculated as well by the aforementioned ex-
tension and expansion of duty with respect at least to commercial owners
and occupiers of land. Whether or not other jurisdictions will follow the
Vermont example in rejecting the voluntariness test in cases raising the
issue of assumption of risk remains to be seen, but it is submitted that
this is a refreshing approach to the modification of an outdated legal
doctrine which has done more harm than good through the years by
often denying without just cause the deserved redress of innocent plain-
tiffs' invaded interests.
PHILIP D. LAMBETH
"Cf Osborne v. Imperial Irrig. Dist., 8 Cal. App. 2d 622,47 P.2d 798 (1935).
1972]

